March 24, 2022 4:00 PM to March 26, 2022 6:15 PM
Sponsored By: Murphy Institute
David Shoemaker, organizer of the biennial New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR), is pleased to announce the program for NOWAR 6, below.
The workshop will take place at the InterContinental New Orleans from March 24 to March 26, 2022. This will be an entirely in-person event, so all participants and registrants must show proof of Covid-19 vaccination to attend. Registration is free, but seating is limited, so first come, first served. To register, please send an email to Professor Shoemaker at firstname.lastname@example.org. At that point, you will be put on the list to receive information about the event and accommodations.
Please note that the schedule below remains subject to change, given that some on that program may not be able to attend. For the most recent information, please visit Profesor Shoemaker's website, here. He will post updates as soon as possible.
Professor Shoemaker is a former faculty member at Tulane University, where was held a professorship in the Department of Philosophy and at the Murphy Institute from 2010 to 2021. With funding and assistance from the Murphy Institute, he founded NOWAR in 2011. He is now a Professor of Philosophy at the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University.
NOWAR 6 Program
March 24-26, 2022
Sponsored by Tulane University’s Murphy Institute, Cornell Univesity, and the LATAM Free Will, Agency, and Responsibility Project
All Workshop Sessions to Take Place at the Intercontinental Hotel
Lasalle Ballroom C
Thursday, March 24
4:00: Welcome and Introductory Remarks (David Shoemaker, Gary “Hoov” Hoover, Santiago Amaya, Manuel Vargas)
4:15-5:15 Juan Pablo Bermúdez (Neuchâtel & Externado), Samantha Berthelette (UCSD), Gabriela Fernandez (Duke and Uni Andes), Alfonso Anaya (University of Warsaw), and Diego Rodriguez (ICESI University), “Positive and Negative Self-Control”
Chair: Manuel Vargas
5:30-6:30: Federico Burdman (Buenos Aires), “Decreased Susceptibility to Influence as a Feature of Desire in Addiction”
Chair: Migdalia Arcila Valenzuela
Friday, March 25
9:30-10:30: Polaris Koi (Turku), “Willpower as a Metaphor”
Chair: Evan Tiffany
Lead Discussant: Austen McDougal
10:45-11:45: Sara Purinton (Penn),” Uncertain Abilities, Diachronic Agency, and Future Selves”
Chair: Geoff Weiss
Invited Lead Discussant: Facundo Alonso
12:00-1:00: Justin D’Arms (Ohio St.) and Daniel Jacobson (UC-Boulder), “Emotional Motivation and Evaluative Judgment: How Emotions Complicate and Compromise Human Agency”
Chair: Nathan Biebel
Invited Lead Discussant: Rachel Achs
3:00-4:00: Elinor Mason (UCSB), “False Consciousness and Fragile Agency: Towards a New Response”
Chair: Irene Bosco
Lead Discussant: Maggie Shea
4:30-5:30: Sara Bernstein (Notre Dame), “Resisting Social Categories”
Chair: Maria Camila Castro Maldonado
Invited Lead Discussant: Oisin Deery
Saturday, November 6
10:30-11:30: Robert Wallace (San Luis Obispo), “Compatibilism as Non-Ideal Theory”
Chair: Matt Talbert
11:45-12:45: Emily Bingeman (Universidad de los Andes), “The Risks of Praise”
Chair: Justin White
Invited Lead Discussant: Robert Hartman
2:30-3:30: Sebastian Figueroa Rubio (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid), “Negligence, Agency, and Ascription of Responsibility”
Chair: Sam Lundquist
Invited Lead Discussant: Taylor Madigan
3:45-4:45: Sam Murray (Duke), “Negligence and the Metaethics of Moral Responsibility”
Chair: Eric Brown
5:00-6:15: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State), KEYNOTE: “On Having the Status ‘Responsible Person’”
Chair: David Shoemaker
Invited Lead Discussant: Jada Twedt Strabbing
NOWAR is a biennial workshop, sponsored by the Murphy Institute at Tulane University (and, in 2021, Cornell University and the LATAM Free Will and Responsibility Project), featuring the presentation of sophisticated original research on issues roughly captured under the label “agency and responsibility.” This general area involves investigation of such questions as: What does it mean to be an agent? How (if at all) does the nature of personhood and personal identity across time bear on questions of agency? What is the nature of, and relation between, moral and criminal responsibility? What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? What do various psychological disorders (autism, psychopathy, cognitive disabilities) tell us about agency and responsibility? What is involved in the development of moral agency? What is the will, willpower, and weakness (or strength) of will? What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? What is the nature of autonomy and how is it related to agency and responsibility?
Work in agency and responsibility, while more or less having a home base in the world of moral philosophy, draws from a host of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (experimental, developmental, etc.), political economy, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, social norm theory, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.
The Oxford University Press series Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, edited by David Shoemaker, draws on presentations from this workshop.